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DECEPTION PLAN BODYGUARD: DECEPTION MODELING AS A MEANS TO BENCHMARK  
RISK

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract of

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upon deception success.

## **Deception Plan Bodyguard: Deception Modeling as a Means to Benchmark Risk**

### **Introduction**

Operation Overlord, the June 6, 1944 Allied invasion of Western Europe, was an undertaking of immense proportion and risk. The largest amphibious assault ever, its success meant defeat for Nazi Germany. Failure, however, could have been as equally dramatic. With the Allies defeated on the shores of northern France, Hitler would have been granted a reprieve of strategic magnitude. The Germans could have transferred decisive power to the Russian front to significantly increase the chance of stalemate and compromise with the Russians<sup>1</sup>. Unconditional German surrender, the Allies' desired outcome for the war, would be at risk. To maximize their opportunities for success, the Allies designed and integrated into Operation Overlord sophisticated deception schemes designed to mislead and confuse the enemy. Known collectively as deception plan Bodyguard, these schemes contributed significantly to the success of Overlord by inducing the Germans to inefficiently deploy their military assets throughout western Europe.

Operation Overlord and deception plan Bodyguard occupy extremes in terms of scale and success. Overlord took place in the context of total conventional world war and the success of deception plan Bodyguard has been described as the greatest achieved by any deception plan. Modern Commanders should tailor their expectations of what Operational Deception can do for them by using deception plan Bodyguard as the standard and then measuring how well they have developed their deception relative to the standard.

Deception planning is not something that comes easily to American war fighters. Its tedious and time-consuming nature runs counter to the 'American Way of War'. However, deception should be embraced because it can be a war winning force multiplier that saves lives. With the American public's abhorrence of battlefield casualties, deception is an asset that should be used to the maximum extent possible. Deception plan Bodyguard also serves as a cautionary tale to those who would use deception. If one has not prepared to the degree and scope that Allied deception planners were for the invasion of Normandy, one could resoundingly fail. When done well enough however, counter to conventional wisdom, Bodyguard teaches that deception planning can be used to the point of risking operational success upon the success of the deception plan. To do so, as demonstrated at Normandy, requires the extraordinary ability to see inside the decision making process of your enemy's critical decision makers. Key to this ability is a deception model that makes the enemy as transparent and unaware as possible.

### **Planning**

Deception planning is not something that comes easily to American war fighters. Americans have never embraced the concept. Deception runs counter to the American way of war because it violates the spirit and intent of offensive combat. The American way of war prefers overwhelming firepower, high tech weaponry, and numerical superiority. Because this way is so successful, devoting human, financial and material resources to deception is argued to be a waste of assets <sup>2</sup>.

Not only does deception run counter to the American way of war, it also runs counter to the average American character. Deception planning is tedious and detail oriented, requiring much patience. Done properly, as was the case for Bodyguard, the effort must start at the top with the Operational Commander and cover all three levels of war (strategic/operational/tactical), coordinating with functional areas such as Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, C2 Warfare, and Operational Fires. The deception plan must also be subordinate to and integrated into the Operational Plan. This need for cross functional coordination and full examination by the entire chain of command exceeds the level of detail and patience the average American planner is willing to devote.

But if the process is so difficult, why ultimately use deception? Because deception can be a tremendous force multiplier and life saver. In the case of Bodyguard, it caused the Germans to falsely estimate the Allied Order of Battle for the invasion of western Europe at 92-97 divisions and then plan accordingly. The actual figures were 35 divisions, plus 3 airborne divisions<sup>3</sup>. It meant that 22 German divisions remained in the Balkans and the German 15<sup>th</sup> Army set idle 200 miles east in Pas de Calais until July 25, 1944<sup>4</sup>. Further, it held almost 240,000 German troops in Scandinavia (12 divisions in Norway/ 6 divisions in Denmark) and kept 19 divisions in Belgium and Holland out of the fight in Normandy<sup>5</sup>. For the first day of Normandy fighting, the Allies had predicted 10,000 dead and 50,000 wounded Allied casualties. Actual figures were 2,500 killed and 12,000 wounded with 129,000 Allied troops safely ashore<sup>6</sup>. Lastly, successful deception greatly supports surprise, one of the 9 principles of war. Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, Normandy Operational Commander, "could not believe that the Allies were to land only south of the Seine." <sup>7</sup> Normandy had to be a feint. The surprise was complete.

### **Measuring Effectiveness: Deception as an Input/Output Model**


The more an Operational Commander risks operational success on deception success, the more urgent the need to measure or estimate the potential effectiveness of the deception. Just as Plato held his ideal forms, Operational Commanders should regard deception plan Bodyguard as an ideal form worth emulation. The Allies risked much with their invasion of Normandy. They realized that if German forces were able to reinforce wherever the invasion force landed in northern France the entire effort might fail<sup>8</sup>. However as events drew close to June 6, 1944, their great anxiety was lessened by their invaluable knowledge that their deception plans continued to function as desired.

Viewed from a systems perspective, deception effectiveness can be explained as a simple Input/Output model. In this model, the system output signal represents the deception story which targets enemy decision makers. The input signal back to the friendly Operational Commander is the observed enemy reaction to the output signal or deception story. Effectiveness expressed here is in terms of estimations. Actual deception effectiveness can not be known until after execution.

The effectiveness of the output signal or deception story depends on 3 variables. Deception stories can be effective only when they are aimed at the proper person: the enemy Operational Commander. Secondly, the output signal must be directed at all enemy intelligence gathering means, specifically focusing on the most favored. Thirdly, the deception story must be as believable as possible to the enemy. The key to enabling such credibility is to maximize knowledge of enemy expectations. The more one understands what the enemy anticipates, the easier it becomes to falsely show him what he expects to see. The "carrier wave" for the deception story or the means by which the story is broadcast is known as the deception means. Deception means can also be described in terms of "spectrum". Spectrum in this case describes the quality, variety, volume, and subtlety of the deception means. The higher the fidelity of the "spectrum", the better the deception means.

The clarity of the input signal into the model or ability to see how the enemy reacts to deception depends on the source and quality of the input signal as well as the speed of receipt and confidence in it. The higher the quality of such variables, the more optimized the input signal becomes and the more transparent the enemy's decision-making process becomes. More plainly, as was the case for the Allies, if one is able to read decrypted messages from an unwitting Hitler only hours after transmission, the clarity of your input signal is outstanding as is the transparency or insight into enemy decision making. In this case the source (Hitler), quality (ULTRA intel), speed (within hours), and confidence (unwitting implies no counter deception) are of the highest order. The closer one approaches this level of effectiveness, the more acceptable risk the Operational Commander can assume in his operational scheme and the more he can depend on deception to deliver operational success. See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1  
Deception Effectiveness as an Input/Output Model



**Effectiveness of Output Signal Increases As:**

- Story Increasingly Tgts Enemy Op CDR
- Story Increasingly Tgts Preferred Enemy Intel Gathering App
- Story Plausibility Increases
  - \*Plausibility Increases w/Increasing Knowledge of Enemy Expectations
- Spectrum Fidelity of the Deception Means Increases
  - \*Fidelity Increases w/Increasing variety, volume, quality, and subtlety of the Deception Means

**Effectiveness of Input Signal Increases As:**

- Source Increases (closeness to enemy Op Cdr)
- Quality Increases (reliability: i.e. ULTRA)
- Speed of Return Increases
- Confidence (certainty of no counter deception)

**Output Signal: Deception Stories**

When designing deception stories, two courses of action are possible. One can elect to reinforce the enemy's expectations and preconceptions or one can attempt to develop a completely new possible course of action<sup>9</sup>. In the case of the Allies, the former was the logical choice due to the fact that they held so much accurate intelligence on German expectations and preconceptions concerning the invasion of western Europe. This course allowed them to maximize the plausibility of their stories, which is essential to the success of any deception plan. Allied planners were well aware that "Hitler called Norway the 'zone of destiny of the war'" and designed Fortitude North (see Table 1) to exploit those concerns<sup>10</sup>. Correspondingly, because the Balkans provided the gateway to German oil supplies in Romania, Zeppelin (see Table 1) was designed to play on Germans fears regarding their security. In regards to planning for Fortitude South (see Table 1), factor space contributed to German expectations that Pas de Calais would be the true invasion location. Pas de Calais represented the



shortest invasion route from England and offered the most direct route to the Ruhr Valley and the industrial heart of Germany. Lastly, the nearby port of Le Harve was outstanding and could serve as a logistics loghead to sustain the Allied drive across France and into Germany<sup>11</sup>.

Bodyguard was the overarching strategic level deception plan designed to "induce the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions in relation to operations by the United Nations against Germany agreed upon at EUREKA."<sup>12</sup>. By presenting false invasion threats throughout western Europe, the goal was to induce the Germans to misallocate their resources by needlessly reinforcing places the Allies would not attack: northern Italy, the Balkans, Greece, and Scandinavia. If German troops remained in these places, they could not oppose Allied forces when they came ashore in France. A simple but powerful idea. Bodyguard was comprised of a constellation of lesser stories summarized in Table 1 and Figure 2. In essence all the stories except for Fortitude South were ambiguity type stories, designed to make the Germans think the invasion could occur anywhere. Fortitude South was a misleading story, designed to make the Germans think the invasion would occur someplace other than it would: Pas de Calais vice Normandy<sup>13</sup>.


**Table 1.**

<b>Deception Plan</b>	<b>Purpose and Story</b>
Fortitude North	Contain enemy forces in Scandinavia The Allies would attack southern Norway on May 1, 1944. Then two weeks later they would attack northern Norway. Once established in Norway, the Allies would attack Denmark. Soviets would support with actual attack against German troops on the Kola Peninsula. <sup>14</sup>
Graffham	Diplomatic deception in support of Fortitude North. Neutral Sweden would assist (aircraft over flight rights / landing rights) the Allied cause in the invasion of Norway and follow on invasion of Denmark. <sup>15</sup>
Royal Flush	Diplomatic deception to exploit

	<p>expected change in attitude of neutrals after successful invasion of Europe.<sup>16</sup> Allies would not pressure Sweden or Spain to stop shipment of strategic materials (iron ore and wolfram) to Germany, thus hoping indirectly to paint a picture that no invasion was imminent.<sup>17</sup></p>
Fortitude South	<p>To sell this story, one big lie had to be sold: That Normandy was the diversionary attack and that the real main attack would occur 200 miles east at Pas de Calais, only six weeks after Normandy. The largest, most elaborate, most carefully planned, most vital, and most successful of all Allied deception operations.<sup>18</sup> A classic double bluff deception in which the real attack was made to appear as a diversion and the diversion made to appear real.<sup>19</sup></p>
Zeppelin	<p>Covers eastern Mediterranean. Make Germans think Allies would attack Crete or western Greece and the Dalmation coast. Also exaggerated forces in place. Soviets would assist by faking an amphibious assault on the Bulgarian base at Varna in the Black Sea.<sup>20</sup></p>
Ironside/Vendetta/Ferdinand	<p>Covers western Mediterranean.  Ironside: actual forces to launch feint on Bordeaux with the purpose of tying down troops halfway between Normandy and the follow on invasion (Anvil) of the French Mediterranean coast, thus unable to help either actual invasion defenders.  Vendetta: Tie Germans to southern France by making them think an Allied invasion would occur there shortly after D-day. Ferdinand: To convince the Germans that the Allies would not land in Southern France as actually planned for August 15, 1944 but instead were really going invade the northwest coast of Italy.<sup>21</sup></p>
Copperhead	<p>Diversion to confuse launch date of D-day. Allies knew Germans believed General Montgomery would participate in any cross channel invasion. The story was that Montgomery would fly to Algiers via Gibraltar to plan the invasion of southern France. Montgomery never flew anywhere in support of such a story. However, an actor resembling him did and was duly observed disembarking from his decoy aircraft in Gibraltar just prior to Normandy -thus adding to German confusion.<sup>22</sup></p>

## STRATEGIC DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN (PLAN OVERLORD), JUNE-AUGUST 1944

Fig 2



### Aimed at Proper Source

The best planned deception will fail if not directed at the proper target: Those with the ability to make strategic or operational decisions. Thus, the enemy Commander becomes the deception target.<sup>23</sup> Bodyguard correctly targeted both the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) or German High Command and Hitler.<sup>24</sup> To work best, one must know the enemy's most trusted means to gather intelligence and then direct the deception effort towards those means, taking pains to ensure that it appears to arrive naturally.<sup>25</sup> The Germans favored means of gathering intelligence was through their England based spy network, which unfortunately for them, had been "turned" by the Allies. By 1941 all Abwehr (German Intelligence) agents in England had been identified and either neutralized or assimilated into the XX or Double Cross Committee.<sup>26</sup> That is, they had become Double Agents. Throughout the war the Germans were none the wiser and in fact some of these agents were considered to be of the "highest reliability by the OKW."<sup>27</sup> Double

Agents became the Abwehr's and, by extension, Hitler's primary source of intelligence for the Western front.

Bodyguard leveraged this advantage to the maximum, using Double Agents as the central means to convey the various deception stories which shrouded Overlord.<sup>28</sup>

It was British Double Agent 'Tricycle' who provided German intelligence with the Allies' false Order of Battle featuring the notional First United States Army Group (FUSAG) or Army Group Patton. Colonel Alexis von Roenne, the Army's Senior Intelligence Chief with Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) accepted the false Order of Battle as legitimate.<sup>29</sup>

As Normandy built in intensity and Allied success, OKW was hit with non-stop requests for reinforcing help from outside sources. On D+2, several units of the 15<sup>th</sup> German Army were to be released to flow south and relief their beleaguered comrades. However, the Double Cross system successfully nullified the potential relief. British Double Agent 'Garbo' reported that Normandy was no more than a diversion. So trusted was this person, that Hitler personally cancelled the deployment orders for those units of the 15<sup>th</sup> Army that were to detach from Pas de Calais.<sup>30</sup> These "output" signals should be considered of the highest order because they directly influenced enemy decision making at the highest level.

Factor force also contributed to the deception by largely denying the Germans the ability to crosscheck the information being fed to them by their "most trusted" spies. Because of Allied air superiority, German aerial reconnaissance, which could have discredited the British Double Agents, could not because it had been too restricted over England since 1941.<sup>31</sup>

Spectrum of Deception Means

Just as knowing enemy preconceptions and fears are critical to drafting plausible story lines, resources devoted towards conveying the deception story are just as critical. If the volume and variety of the "spectrum" carrying the message is not sufficiently believable to the enemy, the deception will fail no matter how plausible the story. A prime issue facing Allied deception planners was how to convey the military forces intrinsic in their deception stories. Two courses could have been pursued. In the first, real forces could have been drawn away from actual combat units and used in the deception effort. Unfortunately for the Allies, they were opposing a German force of such magnitude that actual combat forces dedicated only to deception was not desirable.

Fortunately, however, decrypted German message traffic revealed they were susceptible to the second course or being deceived by notional forces. Decrypted message traffic revealed that the Germans consistently overestimated Allied strength by 20%-30%.<sup>32</sup> This false German belief would allow the Allies to pursue the best deception course possible. Armed with this knowledge, the Allies synthetically constructed and "pointed" large notional forces at the Balkans with Zeppelin, Scandinavia with Fortitude North, and Pas de Calais with Fortitude South to draw attention away from the real invasion site at Normandy.<sup>33</sup>

The variety and volume of the means used to "sell" the deception story to the enemy Operational Commander must be broad based, imaginative, and subtle to be effective. In that regard, the Allies succeeded admirably. Part of the Bodyguard lie was to convince the Germans that no invasion need take place in the summer of 1944 because the Allied strategic bombing offensive alone could win the war. To

support the lie, Allied diplomats in Lisbon, Madrid, Berne, and Stockholm put forth the idea quietly at cocktail parties, knowing it would reach German intelligence, that "Strategic bombing is succeeding beyond all expectations and will win the war."<sup>34</sup>

The Allied press was manipulated to support Bodyguard. To bolster the idea there were not enough landing craft to support an invasion, the press reported that a General Motors labor strike had slowed the production of diesel engines and hence landing craft production. The former part of the story was true, the latter was not<sup>35</sup>. In an unusual event, the British used their press to help save Abwehr's head, Admiral Canaris. The British learned through secret channels that Abwehr's rival intelligence organization, the Political Intel Branch of the SS, planned to dispose of Canaris. Canaris was seen as an Allied asset because of his lack of aggression in ferreting out the truth of Overlord and Bodyguard. To save Canaris, the British launched a successful smear campaign in their press to prop him up in Hitler's eyes, calling him many unsavory things, including an "evil genius".<sup>36</sup> In a case of high subtlety, National Geographic magazine published make believe unit patches of the 24 notional divisions involved in Fortitude, with the deception planners accurately predicting German Intelligence would obtain and add them to the Wehrmacht's US Army Order of Battle.<sup>37</sup> Deception plan Topflight broadcast a series of prerecorded and live radio addresses by high Allied leaders on D-Day to reinforce the idea that Normandy was a diversion and a larger invasion was yet to come. At 10:00 AM a prerecorded message by General Eisenhower on the BBC called Normandy the "initial assault". President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill also spoke that day, both reinforcing Eisenhower's

remarks.<sup>38</sup> All were planted statements and duly reported in the press to help convince the Germans that Normandy was but a diversion.

At the theater operational level, many creative deceptions contained in Fortitude South helped paint the picture that Pas de Calais was the main invasion site. The best camouflage means possible were used to conceal true troop buildups in southwest England where the majority of invasion forces actually were. However, in southeast England, where the Germans were led to believe that troops bivouacked there were to support the false invasion of Pas de Calais, the camouflage was purposely made less effective so that they would be seen in order to reinforce German preconceptions.<sup>39</sup> Also, deceptive night lighting was portrayed in southeast England to convince the enemy that large troop concentrations were there.<sup>40</sup>

The newly created 5<sup>th</sup> Wireless Group, a special electronics unit, performed wireless radio deception to enhance FUSAG's legitimacy. With state of the art equipment, a small group of operators could electronically mimic an entire force. These operators were used to simulate the notional forces "exercising" in preparation for the Pas de Calais invasion.<sup>41</sup> To deceive the limited remaining German photoreconnaissance capability, flotillas of dummy landing craft were displayed in the rivers of southeast England to sustain the illusion that FUSAG would attack Pas de Calais<sup>42</sup> while hundreds of dummy rubber airplane shapes were used to portray the notional XIX Tactical Air Force that would also support the phony invasion.<sup>43</sup> Lastly, an intense bombing campaign against Pas de Calais was conducted to deceptively "soften up" defenses while correspondingly Normandy beaches received less, although still intense, bomber attention.<sup>44</sup>

### *Input Signal: Feedback From the Enemy*

To complete the idea of deception effectiveness as an input/output model, the input signal back to the friendly Operational Commander must be examined. Deception plan Bodyguard offers an outstanding example of quality feedback received from an adversary. The input signal is comprised of two components; operational feedback and analytic feedback. The operational feedback or that which identifies what deception information is reaching the deception target was provided by two main sources for the Allies: ULTRA intelligence from decoded German message traffic and HUMIT. ULTRA was the code name given to intelligence gathered by the successful British effort to break the German Enigma code which transmitted highly classified message traffic. Unknown to the Germans for nearly the duration of the war, the British were reading the highest secrets of the German military as early as April 1940. By January 1944, the Allies were reading up to 4,000 top secret German wireless messages a day. Among those messages read by the Allies were those between the two leaders leading the defense of western Europe, Generals von Rundstedt and Rommel, and those they sent to the OKW. Some messages detailed the strengths and dispositions of all the units under their command, down to company levels.<sup>45</sup>

So successful were the Ultra intercepts in providing operational feedback that at 1200 on D-Day, the Allies read an intercept from Colonel Alexis von Roenne to Hitler confirming the deception planned in Fortitude South was being accepted at the strategic and operational level of the German military. They were convinced Normandy was a diversion and Pas de Calais would be the true invasion site.<sup>46</sup>

HUMIT also provided further critical operational feedback that was successful in maintaining the secrecy of Bodyguard. A disgruntled German Foreign Ministry employee, through Swiss contacts, provided the means to expose a German agent unknowingly employed by the British ambassador to Turkey. The British ambassador maintained Overlord and Bodyguard documents at the Embassy. If compromised, the whole of Operation Overlord would have been at risk. However, this did not happen and instead the unsuspecting German spy was fed a steady diet of information supporting deception plan Zeppelin and the phony invasion of the Balkans.<sup>47</sup>



Regarding the analytical feedback or that which identifies what action the deception target is taking, the Allies benefited because factor force was in their favor.<sup>48</sup> Because they owned air superiority over western Europe, their photoreconnaissance aircraft could act as a crosscheck to further enhance the validity of Ultra intelligence by confirming whether the Germans were physically doing what their Enigma transmissions said they were doing. French Underground members were also able to provide confirming intelligence as well.

### **Conclusions and Lessons Learned**

*"All knowledge, however small, however irrelevant to progress and well being, is part of the whole." Vincent Dethier<sup>49</sup>*

Conclusion: The Allies invaded Normandy under critical circumstances. To defeat Germany unconditionally the Allies needed a second front that more closely approximated the effort being put forth by the Soviets to the east. The invasion from the west was also needed to finally quell the long standing concern that, without it, the Soviets might seek a separate peace with Germany. However, Normandy was also a dual edged sword in that regard. If the Allied invasion failed, the Germans could have potentially shifted decisive combat power from the western front to the Russian front and possibly forced a negotiated peace with the Soviets. Therefore, the stakes were high as the invasion got underway on June 6, 1944.

German forces arrayed in the west were of such significant magnitude that if they could concentrate at a known invasion site, the Allies could have been defeated. To counter this possibility, the Allies devised deception plan Bodyguard which was designed to present

one threat to Pas de Calais and a second that could come anywhere between Scandinavia and northern Italy. This second threat, with its non-specific invasion location was the element that kept German forces from concentrating and thinly spread from Norway to the Adriatic. In essence, Operation Overlord depended upon deception plan Bodyguard to succeed. However, the Allies did not carelessly force themselves into a situation where they were dependent upon deception to succeed. Indeed, they made such decisions with a high degree of confidence due to their unparalleled ability to control what this paper has described as an input/output model of estimated deception effectiveness. On the output side of the model, the Allies were able to "sell" their deception stories to Germany's strategic and operational decision makers due to the enemy's great confidence in their spies working in England. Of course, in reality, these spies were Double Cross spies secretly working for the Allies. On the input side of the model, Allied ULTRA intelligence provided critical operational feedback that allowed them to see how the Germans were reacting to the deception. This input/output model was of such fidelity that German strategic and operational decision making was as nearly transparent as possible. The Allies approached D-day knowing their massive deception was almost certainly going to succeed.

Lesson Learned: In conflict ranging from major conventional war to MOOTW, if the circumstances warrant the risk, operational success may be designed contingent upon deception planning success. However, this should only be attempted if the input/output model presented in this paper can be duplicated with the same level of confidence. That is to say, if one has the ability to reliably convince enemy decision makers of the deception and then be provided with trusted operational feedback

that confirms the desired reaction to the deception, the risk can be managed. However, if this level of confidence can not be duplicated, deception should be used as no more than a force multiplier. Victory should then depend more on the "American way of war": overwhelming firepower, high tech weaponry, and numerical superiority.

Conclusion: HUMIT played a critical role in both conveying the deception stories contained within Bodyguard as well as in protecting its secrecy.

Double Cross spies working for England acted as the main means to convey the "output signal" or deception stories to German Operational Commanders. Because these spies were considered to be of the highest reliability by the Germans, they were particularly effective in convincing them of the false ideas contained in Bodyguard. Similarly, HUMIT provided invaluable contributions on the "input" side of the model. It was a disgruntled German Foreign Ministry employee who revealed a German spy operating within the British Embassy in Turkey. This spy could have compromised Bodyguard if he had not been exposed.

Lesson Learned: HUMIT is vital to effectively conveying deception stories as well as in providing feedback on whether the enemy is reacting desirably or undesirably to the deception. Unfortunately, due to Congressional political machinations in the 1970s, U.S. HUMIT capability is not as strong as it could be. Commanders today should work within their authority to promote and enhance HUMIT capabilities, both inside as well as outside the military. For those principal Agencies outside the Department of Defense that are responsible for HUMIT, Commanders should seek strategic inter-agency alliances with them

as well as advocate on their behalf to further strengthen their HUMINT capabilities.

Conclusion: The Allies successfully used the press on numerous occasions to further the deception contained in Bodyguard. Whether planting false stories about delayed landing craft production or co-opting radio organizations to broadcast pre-recorded supportive Allied messages, the media contributed significantly to the success of Bodyguard.

Lesson Learned: Joint Pub 3-58 (Doctrine for Deception Planning) states deception operations will not intentionally target or mislead the U.S. public, Congress or news media. It further states misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence U.S. decision makers and public opinion is contrary to DoD policy. This sentiment, no doubt partially a reflection of U.S. experience in Vietnam, is well intentioned policy. Compromising public trust can be enormously expensive and highly contentious, as aptly demonstrated by the DoD's recent handling of the Pentagon's Office of Information. However, modern Commanders would do well to remember that Bodyguard teaches the media can serve as a powerful means to promote deception plans. As was the case at Normandy, when national interests or even survival hang in the balance, this should be a lesson well worth remembering.

Conclusion: The Allies successfully used diplomatic means to help convey the deception of Bodyguard. Allied diplomats in neutral Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey helped "sell" two of the major

tenets of Bodyguard: That strategic bombing might obviate the need for and invasion and that if ultimately one was needed, it could not take place until at least the late summer of 1944.

Lesson Learned: Joint Pub 3-58 comprehensively and logically describes current US deception doctrine. However, for unstated but probably logical reasons, it does not address the use of diplomats as able players in the deception game. If Joint Pub 3-58 can not or will not address the valuable contribution this branch of the federal government can make, Commanders should remember this lesson none the less and pursue diplomatic assistance when seeking to employ deception.

Conclusion: By June of 1944 the Allies had owned air superiority over both northern France and England for a considerable length of time. Because of this ability, the Allies were able to crosscheck their prime source of operational feedback (intelligence provided by ULTRA) via photoreconnaissance. This crosscheck capability confirmed for them that the Germans believed the deceit of Bodyguard and were aligning their forces just as decoded Enigma transmissions said they were. Conversely, Allied air superiority denied the Germans the similar ability to crosscheck their primary source of intelligence: their spies based in England. This inability contributed significantly to the success of Bodyguard as the Allies were able to gather a true picture of German intentions while the enemy could not.

Lesson Learned: Control of factor force in one's favor significantly enhances the probability that one's deception plan will work as desired. When the battlespace can be shaped to one's advantage, Commanders can gather both operational and analytical feedback detailing the

functionality of their deception while at the same time denying the enemy Commander the ability to do the same. Without the ability to crosscheck sources of intelligence, enemy Commanders are at a serious disadvantage and more susceptible to deception than the Commander who controls factor space.

Conclusion: Deception plan Bodyguard in effect neutralized 59 German divisions by spreading them throughout western Europe. Because the Allies did not have to face any of these forces when they came ashore at Normandy their casualties on the first day of the invasion were only approximately one quarter of those expected.

Lesson Learned: Any operational function (deception as a sub-function of C2W) that can provide such performance should always be considered a primary tool in the Operational Commander's toolbox. To do any less is negligent.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Parker, R. A. C. Struggle for Survival. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p195.

<sup>2</sup>Dunn, Michael L. "Deception: An Operational Imperative". Unpublished Research Paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1995, p.5.

<sup>3</sup> Koch, James R. "Operation Fortitude: The Backbone of Deception", Military Review (March 1992), p.71.

<sup>4</sup> Bacon, Donald J. Second World War Deception. Wright Flyer Papers, No. 5. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air University. Air Command and Staff College, 1998, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. , p.10.

<sup>6</sup> Breuer, William B. Hoodwinking Hitler. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993, p. 216.

<sup>7</sup> Vego, Milan N. Operational Warfare (NWC 1004). U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, Newport, RI: 2000, p500.

<sup>8</sup> Koch, p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> Critz, M. R. "Operational Deception" (NWC 4083). The U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. Newport, RI: September 1996, p.4.

<sup>10</sup> Bacon, Donald J. Second World War Deception. Wright Flyer Papers, No. 5. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: U.S. Air University. Air Command and Staff College, 1998, p17.

<sup>11</sup> Koch, p69.

<sup>12</sup> Combined Chiefs of Staff. Plan Bodyguard. 20 January 1944. Strategic Plans Division Records, OP 607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, Washington Naval Yard, Washington, DC, pl. Allied bomber strategic bombing offensive (Code name: Pointblank) was so effective that it might alone win the war against Germany. Therefore, US bombers would be built up in the United Kingdom at the expense of building up assault troops in order to accelerate the bombing offensive. Also the story would convey that German fortifications in Northern France were so formidable that invasion forces must be built up even more before attempting any cross channel invasion, thus pushing any possible invasion date into late 1944. Further, Bodyguard would attempt to convey to the Germans that fewer than expected American divisions were arriving from the United States and were not completely finished with their training (implying extra training time would be needed in England). Also, that a British manpower shortage was forcing the cannibalization of disbanding under strength divisions to form fewer but fully manned divisions. Also, that there was a shortage of landing craft due to demand for them in the Pacific Theater of Operations which would further delay any cross channel attack. The desired perception was for the Germans to think that the Balkans would be the Allies' spring objective due to the above restrictions.

<sup>13</sup> Bacon, p10.

<sup>14</sup> Vego, p500.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. , p497.

<sup>16</sup> Cruickshank, Charles C. Deception in World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p96.

<sup>17</sup> Vego, p497.

<sup>18</sup> Cruickshank, p171.

<sup>19</sup> Koch, p68.

<sup>20</sup> Vego, p497.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. , p497.

<sup>22</sup> Cruickshank, p96.

<sup>23</sup> Vego, p507.

<sup>24</sup> Koch, p69.

<sup>25</sup> Vego, p507.

<sup>26</sup> Breuer, p49. England formally went to war with Germany on September 3, 1939. Within hours, Britain's counter intelligence agency, MI-5, and Scotland Yard began rounding up known German spies in Great Britain. Within 10 days 256 agents had been arrested, shattering the network created by Abwehr after years of hard work. Within months 7 of the arrested German spies had been executed by England. However, shortly thereafter, the British hit upon the idea of offering a select few of the condemned spies the opportunity to save their lives if they turned sides and agreed to work for the British against the Germans. Of those few offered the opportunity, all accepted. The effort, collectively known as the XX Committee (Twenty), was soon known by its better name: The Double Cross Committee. Thus, early in the war, Great Britain had in place an intelligence network of invaluable wealth that would remain undetected by the Germans through the conclusion of the war.

<sup>27</sup> Koch, p69.

<sup>28</sup> Bacon, p13.

<sup>29</sup> Breuer, p118.

<sup>30</sup> Koch, p73.

<sup>31</sup> Cruickshank, p76.

<sup>32</sup> Koch, p69.

<sup>33</sup> Cruickshank, p177-180. Regarding the invasion of northern France, Fortitude South would portray Normandy as a diversion and Pas de Calais as the actual main invasion that would occur after the Germans had committed their reserves to Normandy. The key to this deception was to sell the notional First United States Army Group (FUSAG) as



the Pas de Calais invasion force. In reality, the actual divisions that comprised the FUSAG were really dedicated Normandy invasion forces. Stationed in southeast England, the 9 US and 2 Canadian divisions were purposely exposed and deceptively portrayed to the German intelligence apparatus as Pas de Calais assault troops. The Allies desired the Germans to believe that Pas de Calais was the main invasion point for as long as possible. However, that would become more and more problematic as Normandy progressed. The Allies correctly assumed that as the actual divisions comprising the false FUSAG were observed operating in the Normandy area, the Germans would soon conclude the deception behind FUSAG and, correspondingly, the fact that Pas de Calais was a ruse and Normandy was the real invasion after all. To sustain the lie, once the actual divisions 'rotated out' of FUSAG, the Allies 'replaced' them with the notional nine divisions they had been deceptively portraying to the Germans via false wireless activities, false National Geographic articles, false Orders of Battle passed by double agents, and other means. To further enhance the believability of the fictitious divisions, only credible names known to the Germans were portrayed as leading the FUSAG. Hence, to his displeasure, General Patton was selected as FUSAG's first Commanding General. The net effect was that the Germans still saw FUSAG as fully manned and aimed straight at the heart of Pas de Calais up to six weeks after the Normandy invasion, thus the lie remained intact.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. , p94.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. , p95.

<sup>36</sup> Breuer, p18.

<sup>37</sup> Koch, p70.

<sup>38</sup> Breuer, p215.

<sup>39</sup> Cruickshank, p. 176-177.

<sup>40</sup> Koch, p. 71-72.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. Joint Pub 3-58. Washington, DC: 31 May 1996, PII-7.

<sup>42</sup> Koch, p. 72.

<sup>43</sup> Breuer, p.228.

<sup>44</sup> Koch, p.71-72.

<sup>45</sup> Breuer, p. 47.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 215-216. So successful were the Ultra intercepts in providing operational feedback on the success of Fortitude South that at 1200 on D-Day, the Allies read an intercept from Foreign Armies West, Colonel Alexis von Roenne's intelligence in the OKW. His message to Hitler confirmed that the deception planned in Fortitude South was being accepted at the strategic and operational level of the German government. His "while the Anglo-Saxon landing on the coast of Normandy represents a large scale operation, the forces employed comprise only a relatively small portion (of arriving enemy divisions). Of the 90 (divisions)

in southern England only 10 to 12, including airborne troops appear to be participating so far. Not a single unit from First United States Army Group, which comprises around 25 large formations has so far been committed. The same holds true of the 10 to 12 combat formations in Scotland (the dummy 4th Army). This suggests that the Army is planning a further large scale operation in the channel area, which one would expect to be aimed at the Pas de Calais." was absolute confirmation that the deception had worked exactly as desired.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. , p.28.

<sup>48</sup> Critz, p. 13.

<sup>49</sup> Dethier, Vincent G. To Know a Fly. San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1962.

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